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The Syrian War is a highly concerning factor for national security in the XXIst
Century. The dangers that originate from the war such as terrorism, arms proliferation,
and  population  displacement  represent  grave  regional  and  international  threats.
Moreover,  in  a  globalized  society  that  is  saturated  with  outlets  for  instant
communication,  propaganda  has  never  had  a  more  fertile  ground  to  grow in.  This
convergence of highly volatile political and social destabilization are concerns that must
be addressed  to  guarantee national  security.  Western foreign interests are constantly
challenged  by  a  variety  of  actors,  and  Russia  is  an  especially   urgent  case.  It  is
symptomatic of a larger issue that, for instance, since 2013 the President of the United
States has lost his position in Forbes magazine's rankings of most powerful person on
earth to  President  Vladimir  Putin  of  Russia.  As American and  European strategy is
continuously and increasingly put to the test by other rising powers, it is imperative to
recognize the mechanisms through which countries such as Russia and Syria project
their image and influence public opinion on the events and conflicts that are occurring
throughout the world. What follows is an historical analysis of the propaganda that is




The relationship between Russia and Syria  is  a strategic partnership with the
purpose of strengthening the Russian sphere of influence and power projection in the
Near East, an area of vital Russian geopolitical interest. For Syria it is a relationship that
furnishes military, economic and diplomatic support from a powerful ally. This analysis
seeks to shed light on how history has shaped the relationship between Russia and Syria
and how propaganda has been utilized as an apparatus in service of these two actors
especially between the years of the Syrian Assad administration from 1970 and 2016.
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A relação entre  a  Rússia  e  a  Síria  é  uma parceria  estratégica com o fim de
fortalecer a esfera de influência Rússia e a sua projecção de poder no Médio Oriente,
uma área de interesse geo-estratégico vital para a Rússia. Relativamente à Síria, esta
relação  fornece-lhe  apoio  militar,  económico,  e  diplomático de  um poder  de ordem
superior. Esta análise procura compreender a amizade histórica entre a Rússia e a Síria e
como a propaganda tem sido utilizada como um aparelho em serviço destes dois actores,
especialmente durante anos da administração Assad na Síria entre 1970 e 2016.





Propaganda  is  the  art  of  the  anti-science.  Where  science  is  concerned  with
rational methodologies that advance the understanding of the world through reason and
multifaceted  discourse,  propaganda  serves  to  accomplish  the  opposite:  it  seeks  to
manipulate a debate or thought process and promote a predetermined conclusion at the
expense  of  alternative  options.  While  propaganda  can  be  deployed  with  scientific
support,  it  is  ultimately  unscientific  in  its  spirit,  which  is  focused  on  the
predetermination of ideas. It  is an inextricable part of human communication by the
nature of mankind, which is instinctively driven by self-preservation and self-interest
not just of the individual, but of the group as well. How to identify the discrete forms
which  propaganda  takes  is  a  significant  question  in  its  field  of  study,  as  different
environments, purposes, and varying degrees of aggressiveness make a clear definition
elusive and generates a broadness of scope that plagues the categorization of identifying
markers.  In  1627  the  Catholic  Church  under  Pope  Urban  VIII  established  the
Congregatio de Propaganda fide in Rome to spread the message of the Church in the
New  World  and  counteract  the  growing  influence  of  the  Protestants.1 This  minted
propaganda's definition as the organized spread of ideas. However it was not only until
World War I that the word would become infamous, despite its technical practice by
many countries and governments before the war.2
Political scientists and sociologists such as Harold Lasswell and Jacques Ellul
have  commented  on  propaganda,  devising  theoretical  structures  that  categorize  and
facilitate its identification. Propaganda is a form of communication that can be created
and received in  both conscious and unconscious ways.  Lasswell  enumerated several
1 Bernays, Propaganda. p. 48
2 Idem, p. 11
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ways propaganda may take shape, using as examples, the Anti-Cigarette League, civic
associations, amateurs, state organs, and corporations.3
Jacques  Ellul's  analysis  rests  on  several  theoretical  structures  based  on
dichotomous gradients  that  align the purposes  and origins of  propaganda on several
axis. The two axis in respect to the goals of propaganda are the Political-Sociological
and Agitation-Integration camps.  The political  and sociological  duality is  concerned
with the targets of propaganda: political propaganda is  aimed at  influencing popular
opinion on civic organizations, while sociological propaganda is focused on ties at a
societal  level.  The  difference can be  exemplified in  two posters,  one  advocates  the
election of a political party, while another warns about the dangers of recreational drug
use. Agitation-Integration is the degree to which propaganda can pull people apart or
push them together. Agitation is embodied in calls like the Soviet Union's for resistance
against  “Zionism and  imperialism”,  and integration  could  be seen during Portugal's
Estado Novo period in the insistence that Portugal was a multi-racial pluri-continental
unitary state.
The Vertical-Horizontal and Rational-Irrational gradients are respectively related
to the production of propaganda and to what degree reason or emotion are targeted by
the propagandist. Vertical propaganda is generated through hierarchical processes, like
ministries such as the Committee on Public Information, the Soviet Union's Department
of  Agitation  and  Propaganda,  or  modern  day  PR  firms.  Horizontal  propaganda  is
generated in a decentralized manner, the most current and relevant example would be
politically active forums on the internet.
The  Rational-Irrational  characteristic  leans  in  two  directions:  rational
propaganda can be as simple as an advertisement that lists the superior specifications of
a car relative to the competition, but the emotional side convinces the buyer through
3 Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda. p. 629
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seductive appeals such as “this is the car a real man would drive.”4
Propaganda constructs narratives by using cultural networks of information. A
person's  capability of  understanding common symbols  is  defined by E.D.  Hirsch as
“cultural literacy.” Hirsch believes that the background information held in the minds of
a population binds them and is an essential part of communication. A population that
has  a  common  history,  culture,  and  language  will  understand  subtle  queues  and
references that are evoked in the transmission of ideas. Lasswell writes that it is these
significant  symbols  that  are  managed  by  the  propagandist  to  influence  collective
attitudes.5 6 Propaganda in short is the power to convince. The line where propaganda
ends  and  coercive  force  begins,  especially  where  states  are  concerned,  is  a  subject
approached in Joseph Nye's conception of Soft Power and Hard Power. Soft power is a
country's ability to generate sympathy and the internalizing of political ideals and policy
in  foreign  nations.7 Hard  power  relates  to  the  use  of  aggressive  policies  such  as
espionage and use of military force.
The state actors of the XXIst Century rely on propaganda to support their foreign
policy goals. In an era of high connectivity provided by technology, the perceptions (or
the presentations) of events and the opinions of the public are highly susceptible to the
influences  of  propagandists.  Owing to  the waves  of  unrest  resulting from the  Arab
Spring,  the  West,  Russia,  Syria,  and  others  are  currently  locked  in  a  volatile
confrontation over the future of the Syrian people. The messages these entities emit are
crafted to influence opinion and support favorable outcomes for implemented policies.
The relationship between Syria and Russia is a critical aspect for Russian foreign policy,
both in terms of soft power propaganda and hard power politics. President of Russia
4 Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. pp. 62-84
5 Hirsch, Cultural Literacy p. 2
6 Lasswell, p. 627
7 van Herpen, Marcel H. Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016. p. 21
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Vladmir Putin spoke of soft power in Moscovskie Novosti: “Soft power [is] a complex
of instruments  and methods to  achieve  foreign policy objectives  without  the use of
weapons […] The distinction must be made clearly between where there is freedom of
expression and normal political activity and where illegal instruments of "soft power"
are used...  the activity of "pseudo-NGOs" [and] other structures which, with outside
support,  have  the  aim  to  destabilize  the  situations  in  this  or  that  country  is
unacceptable.”8
In essence, Russia has combined both soft power and hard power in a revitalized
propaganda machine inspired by the former Soviet system, which is used to defend the
Kremlin's  line  and  its  actions.  Damascus  has  also  used  mass  media  to  promote  its
message throughout the world which among other efforts includes the drive to project a
positive image of President Assad. How these two actors have developed their influence
throughout history is fundamental for the analysis of the War in Syria. The West has
suffered directly because of its  own intervention in  this conflict,  and it  is  from this
concern that it  is necessary to  comprehend what has happened in Syria, what is  the
Russian-Syrian perspective, how both actors promote said perspective, and what can be
done to guarantee peace and stability in Syria and beyond.
8 Idem, p. 27
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Background
Russian-Syrian relations are predominantly defined by a strategic alignment of
interests   in  geopolitical  issues  throughout  regional  and  global  fronts.  Russia's
relationship  with  Syria  is  the  longest-lasting and  strongest  bond  forged  outside  the
Warsaw Pact  during the Cold War and outside the Eurasian Economic Union of the
modern  day.  While  at  times  facing  diverging  pursuits  and  imbalances  within  the
relationship, the Moscow-Damascus friendship has proven resilient and beneficial to
both  parties.  This  relationship  is  the  product  of  the  specific  political  environments
unique to each nation, and in order to properly contextualize the positions that these
nations and their governments take in the world it is necessary to understand how they
came to be formed. In Bashar al-Assad's words:  "If you do not understand the culture
and the politics you don't understand the decision we make as a leader."9
Russia
Russia is a complex, massive country with over a thousand years of history and
a great variety of peoples living within its borders. Russia's identity is tempered with
profound influences originating from Byzantine, Viking, and Mongol interactions with
the peoples of Eastern Europe, which have led to debates on the extent of its European
identity, both inside of Russia and outside. Russia's territory is mostly Asiatic, but these
areas  are  sparsely populated relative  to  the  lands  west  of  the  Urals,  the  traditional
boundary between Asia and Europe. When taking in account its historical bonds and
cultural inheritance it can be concluded that Russia is the sum of its contacts with Asia
9 Rose, Charlie. “Interview with Bashar al-Assad”, 2006. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqQa-
QSMMjs>
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and Europe, and is not easily represented by a single continental interpretation. It  is
composed of many peoples but majority Slavic as a result of the expansionist colonial
policies of the Tsars and slavicizing influence of the Orthodox Church. Like any nation,
Russia has its own idiosyncrasies and a past that make it unique and must be observed
in context to reveal, even if partially, the thought process and concerns of the Russian
people and especially its government.
The cultural ancestor to the eastern Slavic nations was the Kievan Rus, a union
of loosely-affiliated Slavic tribes that lived in the paths of the trade routes connecting
the  Byzantine  and  Viking  civilizations  in  an  area  that  encompassed  modern  day
Ukraine.10 The proof that these foreign ties were valued and cultivated is evident in the
marriage  pacts  such  as  Iaroslav  (988-1054)  with  Ingigerde,  and  how  among  the
descendants of the Byzantine Emperor Monomakh was Vladimir II the Grand Prince of
the  Kievan  Rus.  Saints  Cyril  and  Methodius  created  the  Galgolithic  and  Cyrillic
alphabets in the 9th Century to translate church works into Slavic languages.
The adoption of Christianity by Prince Vladimir the Great (960-1015) tied the
future  of  a  large  part  of  Eastern Europe with the  Orthodox Church.  Byzantine-Rus
relations were also influenced by a strategic necessity to confront the Cumans in the east
which threatened both the Kievan Rus and the Byzantine Empire.11 There is a legend
surrounding a crown called the cap of Monomakh which is said to have been given to
Prince Vladimir by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine. This legendary gesture was the
origin for the concept of Moscow as the “Third Rome”, destined to become the center of
a  religious  and  influential  empire.12  The  effect  of  Byzantine  religious-political
structures on modern Russia is noticeable. The modern day Russian Orthodox Church
10 Milhazes, José. Rússia e Europa: uma parte do todo. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 
2016.  p.15
11 Idem, pp. 16-17
12 Idem, p. 18
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operates with the Russian state with a similar respect as the Byzantine Church operated
with the Emperor  in  a concept  called  symphonia;  though the Russian application in
reality it is asymmetrical in its balance of power between church and state.13
In the XIIIth Century the Russian principalities would suffer a devastating shock
at the hands of the Mongol invaders which left vast swaths of territory under the rule of
an authoritarian foreign power. Pope Innocent IV convened the Council of Lyon with
the  purpose  of  understanding  how  to  halt  the  advance  of  the  Mongol  horde.  The
decision was made to ask for  Daniil  of  Galicia's  support  in a front  against  Mongol
aggression, but Daniil saw the necessity of maintaining peace and avoiding the wrath of
Genghis Khan. Daniil became a tributary of the Mongol empire but in return he spared
his  people  from  war  and  gained  greater  autonomy relative  to  the  Mongol  vassals
subjugated by force. Alexander Nevski, another Grand Prince, is a contested figure that
decided cooperation with the Mongols was preferable to war.
Threatened  from  west  and  east  by  Scandinavians,  Catholics  and  Mongols,
Nevski's responses to the complex threats emanating from every direction against him
have been debated furiously for centuries. In José Milhazes' analysis  Rússia e Europa
there are identified three major approaches to how Nevski is treated by historians: the
first, and most traditional, is that Nevski is a saint that saved Russia from the Catholics,
the Mongols, and Lithuania. Lev Gumilov's view sees Nevski as the architect of the
alliance  with  the  Mongol  Horde,  compounded  by  his  friendship  with  Batye  Khan.
Valentin  Ianin  describes  Nevski  as  a  pragmatic  despot,  whose accomplishments  are
exaggerated for historical posterity.14
Through the lessons these events have taught, one can comprehend that Russians
have been affected by a history of invasion and occupation from hostile foreign powers
13 van Herpen, p. 166
14 Milhazes, pp. 19-21
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surrounding, using Halford Mackinder's geopolitical terminology, the Heartland.15 These
challenges  required a response of calculating alliances and strong political  decision-
making processes. Herein lies the genesis of despotic power in Rus, thus consequently
the  autocratic  basis  for  Imperial  Russia  and  beyond. The  effects  of  the  Mongol
occupation are just  as contentious.  Boris Rybavok blames Mongols for throwing the
development of Rus back several centuries. It is estimated by historians such as Boris
Sponar that the Mongols exterminated nearly one third of the population of Rus.
Nevertheless, the political readjustment caused by the Mongols is for instance
seen by the celebrated historian Karamzin as the cause of ascension of the Principality
of Muscovy. The Mongol's held onto their conquered territories in Russia until Dimitri
Danskoi revolted against  the his suzerains and defeated their forces  in the Battle of
Kulikovo, in 1380.16
In  1453 Constantinople  fell  to  the  Turks.  In  1472,  Ivan  III  (1440-1505)  the
Grand Prince of Muscovy married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor. Soon the
Grand Princes began  using the title  Tsar and Autocrat  and  adopted the bicephalous
(double-headed) eagle of Byzantium as a symbol of personal power.17 Ivan III was faced
with foes in several hostile fronts: despite the Western Catholic Europeans considering
Ivan III a potential friend, Ivan found that securing access to the Baltic Sea (therefore
securing  access  to  Europe)  through  war  against  Poland-Lithuania  was  of  far  more
strategic importance.
Ivan also developed ties with the Khan of Crimea, Mengli Heray I (1445-1515)
whose assistance was necessary to defeat the Mongol Golden Horde in the east. Under
Ivan's rule, Russian interests in the Baltic and Black sea become a central theme from
Russian strategy. These two seas define the relations between Russia and its western
15 van Herpen, p. 191
16 Milhazes, p. 23
17 Idem, p. 24
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neighbors: Russia realized it must have access to both bodies of water to guarantee trade
route income, safety, and open lines of communication with the outside world.18
In  1612,  the  Romanov dynasty rose  to  power  and  continued  the  process  of
Russian acquisition of territories to access the Black and Baltic seas.  Tsar Peter  the
Great (1672-1725), the first Emperor of Russia, focused on Ottoman and Scandinavian
foes which had become powerful in their own right,  dominating and blockading the
Black and Baltic seas, both of essential Russian interest.19 Russia won the Northern War
against  the  Swedes  and Peter  founded  the city of  Saint  Petersburg,  whose  name is
indicative of a Germanophilic current in Russian society: Peter specifically chose the
German  word  sankt  over  the  Russian  svyatoy, and  utilized  the  suffix  burg  for  his
namesake city.20
Russia's captivation with Europe during the Enlightenment era had Tsars such as
Peter  I  and Catherine II  inviting foreign specialists  from the West  to advise on the
development of the Russian state and society. Russian nobility spoke foreign languages
such  as  French  while  Russian  itself  became  a  vulgar  tongue,  this  was  common
throughout Europe as French was the  lingua franca  used in international diplomacy..
The adoption of Western customs was however a superficial act.  While Catherine II
preoccupied herself with corresponding with illuminated figures such as Diderot and
Voltaire,  the Empress utilized philosophy to justify her own absolutist  form of rule.
Montesquieu's  works were for  instance was used to legitimize harsh leadership that
stemmed from the oppressive nature of the Russian environment: cold and merciless.
This became more obvious after the Peasant's War (1773-1775), where Catherine
II became openly hostile and persecuted Enlightenment thinkers.21 Among Catherine's
18 Idem, pp. 25
19 Idem, p. 31
20 van Herpen, p. 182
21 Milhazes, pp. 32-33
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accomplishments  is  the  conquest  of  Crimea  and  the  subsequent  treaties  of  Kuçuk
Kaynarca in 1774 and Jassy in 1792 in which the Ottoman empire recognized Russian
dominion on the coasts of the Northern Black Sea.
In the early XIXth Century Russia was invaded by Napoleonic France, and the
French  suffered  an  historic  defeat  culminating  in  the  Russian  Tsar,  Alexander  I,
marching triumphantly in the streets of Paris. This placed Russia in a powerful position
to dominate the European mainland in the post-Napoleonic period, a state of affairs that
strategists in Great Britain would find unacceptable and worked to suppress, in Asia,
Europe,  and  in  the Americas,  where Russia  had colonies.  This  fear  of  the bear  led
popular opinion of Russia throughout Europe to reach a familiar low later in the XIXth
Century.  Astholphe-Louis-Leonor,  Marquis  of  Custine,  wrote  a  highly  critical  book
titled “Russia in 1839”, in which he declared that Russia “is a barbarian country whose
own population collaborates with its own oppression.”22
The Marquis further went on to say "Social life in this country is a permanent
conspiracy against the truth. Anyone who is not duped is regarded there as a traitor... to
refute a lie, to contradict a political claim... is an attack on the security of the state."23 In
this century a debate develops between those who identified Russia's future with the
West,  the  Occidentalists,  and  those  who believed  Russia  had  its  own character  and
destiny, the Slavophiles. Among the Slavophiles were such authors as Mikhail Katkov,24
Ivan Aksakov,25 Nikolai Danilevsky,26 Fiodor Dostoievsky;27 those who believed in the
ultimate truth of the Orthodox faith and Europe as a “spiritual Egypt” for Russians,
22 Idem, p. 34
23 van Herpen, p.3
24 Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887), nationalist journalist, graduate of Moscow University. Editor of the 
Moscow News.
25 Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886) author, journalist, and soldier, veteran of the Crimean War.
26 Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1185) religious conservative writer, historian and naturalist, an opponent of
Darwinism. Graduate of the University of St. Petersburg
27 Fiodor Dostoievsky (1821-1881) graduate of the University of St. Petersburg, wrote on a great variety 
of topics ranging from psychology to Christianity.
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evoking the sense of a past long gone and disconnected by time from Russia. In the
Occidentalist  camp there can be found thinkers such as  Piotr Chaadaev,28 Alexander
Herzen,29 Georgi  Plekhanov,30 and  Vladimir  Lenin.31 Despite  the  intensity  of  the
debates,  Marlene Laruelle found that “defining Russia as belonging to a ‘civilisation’
[was] always made in relation to Europe as the yardstick, never to Asia.”32
The Russo-Japanese war and later the First World War delivered critical blows to
the Tsar. The wars and domestic upheavals in the Empire resulted in the Tsar's slide into
political irrelevance and then bloody extinction in the Bolshevik coup d'etat. The First
World War turned from an imperialist war to a civil war, and out of the ashes of this
conflict the communist revolutionary model would come to dominate Eastern Europe
and threaten the world. In this transformation, Russia metamorphosed from a “copier to
a model”33 and began a series of not only military but ideological expansions throughout
the world using propaganda, international conferences, and foreign parties.
During this  time a  group of  political  thinkers  developed in  the ranks  of  the
political prisoners in the USSR and the more fortunate emigré community that escaped
the Soviets. These were the Eurasianists.  Among these were Lev Gumilev,34 Nikolai
Trubetskoy,35 and Piotr Savitsky.36 Ultimately, the purpose of the Eurasian movement
was to  promote  a  Federal  Eurasian  state,  with  borders  not  unlike the USSR's.  This
28  Piotr Chaadaev (1794-1856), veteran of the Napoleonic wars, writer and outspoken critic of the Tsar 
and what he considered the poor condition of Russian social, philosophical, cultural, and economic 
development.
29  Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) socialist agrarian writer, graduate of the University of Moscow.
30  Georgi Plekhanov (1856-1918), Marxist philosopher, opponent of Tsar Nicholas II's empire and also 
of Lenin's Bolshevik government.
31  Milhazes, p. 35-37
32  Laruelle, Marlene. "Russia as an anti-liberal European Civilization." Ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge 
Blakkisrud. The New Russian Imperialism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. 275-97. 
Web. 28 Jun. 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1bh2kk5.17> p. 278
33  Milhazes, p. 39
34  Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) Russian writer and historian, son of two famous poets Nikolai Gumilev 
and Anna Akhmatova, developed theory of passionarost, or “passionarity” that seeks to encapsulate 
the impulse that drives people to achieve great feats. Many of his ideas were a result of Gumilev's 
time in the Gulag prison system.
35  Nikolai Trubetskoy (1890-1938), Russian linguist and historian, graduate of Moscow University.
36  Piotr Savitsky (1895-1968) Eurasianist author and proponent of the idea of Russia as the “Third 
Continent” and center of the Old World; an entity that is neither European nor Asian.
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school of thought would have great influence in the post-Soviet period.37 The Russian
Republic, later the Soviet Union, aimed a campaign of propaganda against the West for
almost a century. Immediately following the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Civil War,
an unsuccessful war was fought against a freshly independent Poland in a communist
attempt  to  dominate  Eastern Europe  and  recover the  lost  territories  that  guaranteed
Russia access to the Baltic and the Black seas.
Stalin's Great Purge (1936-1938) wiped out political opponents, and in Ukraine
millions of peasants and farmers died of famine. The intelligentsia, among other classes,
were ideologically and systematically filtered and placed the Gulag labor camp system
or simply executed after a mock trial. This effort was directed to filter the ranks of the
communist party so that only Stalinist loyalists remain. Even then, men who were in
Stalin's grace would often soon find themselves in the Gulags and their person wiped
from  official  records  and  images.  The  Red  Army  that  came  to  replace  “bloody”
Nicholas  II  was  simply  a  different  kind  of  authoritarian  dictatorship.  During  these
harrowing events the West did not interfere and even profited from the USSR, hoping
that the Soviet Union would someday collapse under its own weight.38
This enabling paved the way for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the invasion
of Poland by National Socialist Germany and the USSR. The hesitations demonstrated
by the Allied powers in the lead-up to the pact left an opportunity open for cooperation
between both authoritarian states  that  held deep suspicion for  the Western capitalist
nations.  Both  powers  worked  in  tandem  to  split  Eastern  Europe  into  spheres  of
influence  as  they  geared  up  for  their  inevitable  ideological  showdown.  The  Soviet
Union lost over 20 million people in World War II, the highest number of casualties of
any country involved in the war, closely followed by China.
37  Milhazes, p. 40
38  Pozner, Vladmir et al. “The West vs. Russia.” Debate. Munk Debates. 
<http://www.munkdebates.com/debates/the-west-vs-russia>
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In  post-war  Europe,  the  Soviet  Union  enjoyed  a  superiority  of  conventional
weapons  vis-à-vis  NATO,  which  forced  the  American  military  strategy,  led  by
Eisenhower, to focus on the development of a nuclear arsenal to counter-balance the
USSR's conventional numeric advantage. Today the situation is just the opposite: NATO
holds the conventional advantage, while Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles are greater
than the West's.39 The Cold War's potential to spiral out of control was checked by the
Mutually  Assured  Destruction  doctrine  which  forced  superpowers  to  constrain
themselves to subterfuge, proxy wars, and propaganda to push the narratives against
each other and prepare the minds of enemies and allies alike for the eventuality that a
Third World War could break out.
This  was achieved by the Soviet  Union through the financing of  communist
parties worldwide, supporting the Council for Peace and Cooperation, and encouraging
demonstrations against  NATO actions,  all  with the purpose of  confounding Western
policies and advancing Soviet interests. World War III fortunately did not happen. The
USSR and the Cold War did not come to an end through force of arms, or sanctions, or
isolation. The system that Communism promulgated was simply flawed in its principles
and could not function, so it collapsed. The war in Afghanistan coupled with the fall of
oil prices in the 1980s contributed to the pressure put on the Soviet system.40
The 1990s were watershed years for Russia. Economic turmoil, attempted coups,
and a reduction of territory back to XVIIth Century borders damaged the Russian psyche
profoundly.  Despite  inheriting  Soviet  embassies  and  the  USSR's  seat  in  the  United
Nations Security Council, Russian standing in the world was crippled. Among many
internal  issues  that  still  hurt  Russians  today are  widespread  corruption,  criminality,
39  Clapper, et al. 2015 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment. Warsaw: Progressive
Management Publications/Amazon Fulfillment, 2015.  p. 65
40  Milhazes, p. 51
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alcoholism, drug abuse, and an HIV epidemic.41 This period saw the enrichment of a
small oligarchy and the wealth disparity grew.42 The cut-backs affected private life and
the military which was painfully felt in tragedies such as the Kursk submarine disaster
in 2000. Marcel van Herpen separates this period into two stages: the robber-baron stage
and the meta robber-baron stage.
The  initial  stage  under  Yeltsin  saw  parts  of  the  Russian  economy  become
privatized into a small group of individuals, the latter stage was characterized by a re-
nationalization of those entities into the hands of President Putin and the siloviki, the ex-
KGB and ex-military men who have surrounded the Russian President  and profited
tremendously off their partnership. The principle difference between the behavior of the
barons lies in the extended use of the judiciary in the Putin era. The state organs are
used to repress  individuals  that  threaten the profit  President Putin's  group stands to
make: legal threats, criminal investigations, “tax-measures”, imprisonment, blackmail,
and even death threats and assassinations are used as tools to keep the elite on top. The
monopolization  of  Russia's  resources  through companies  like  Gazprom and Rosneft
under the  siloviki is  a great  benefit  for the objectives of Putin's  policy,  where these
organizations are used as tools of pressure in Ukraine or influence in countries such as
Germany.43
Under  Putin's  watch  Russia  has  re-engaged  its  propaganda,  espionage,  and
military machine  to  levels not  seen since the Soviet  Union.44 Putin's  success  is  not
artificial,  according  to  the  Levada  Center,  Putin's  approval  ratings  have  been
consistently around 80%. In fact they were boosted thanks to the Crimea annexation,
along with unilateral military actions in Chechnya, South Ossetia, Georgia.45 Along with
41 van Herpen, p. 134
42 Milhazes, p. 53
43 van Herpen, pp. 220-221
44 Idem, p. 268
45 Levada Center. “Ratings” <http://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/>
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aggressive foreign policy maneuvers, President Putin's  tenure encompassed the early
2000s  commodities  boom and high  oil  prices  which  contributed greatly  to  Russian
growth  and  the  positive  image  Russian  people  hold  of  their  President.  There  is  an
undeniably new found purpose in Russia under Putin who has gained his support from
the economic situation seen early in the President's tenure and his administration's hard
power politics.46 In 2000, Russia abandoned its nuclear “No first strike” policy in favor
of a “escalate to deescalate” policy where Moscow will threaten or if necessary launch a
nuclear strike in order to force outcomes in Russia's favor.47
Russia  is  the  sum  of  two  different  worlds:  the  Asian  and  European  world.
Democratism and Communism emanated from Europe, while authoritarian collectivist
multiculturalism  was  the  primary  influence  from  Asia.  The  confluence  of  these
philosophies and practices resulted in the modern Russian system of government that
the former deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov48 calls “sovereign democracy.” A
democracy run by an authoritarian system.
46 Clapper, et al, p. 117
47 Idem, p. 65
48 Vladislav Surkov (b. 1964) First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration (1999-2011)




The region modern Syria occupies has been inhabited by humanity for thousands
of years. It is home to one of the most ancient continuously inhabited cities in the world:
Damascus.  The  origins  of  this  country  have  deep  roots  far  back  into  time  to  the
Assyrians, Egyptians, Hittites, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans. Islamic Syria's history
begins with the Rashidun Caliphate's conquest in the VIIIth Century of what was called
the Bilad al-Sham that demarcated an area encompassing modern-day Lebanon, Israel,
and Syria.49 Islam has been fraught with tribalism since its inception, the Syrian poet
Adonis commented that there is an “absence of plurality” in Arab thinking.
This is to the point where a clan once allied to the prophet Mohammed's, the
Ansar,  was pushed from exercising power after the prophet's  death by Mohammed's
tribe, the Quraysh.50 Tribal and factional power struggles have defined so-called Islam, a
religion in  which the  realm of  politics  is  subordinate  to  God's  word as  revealed to
Mohammed.  The  Bilad  al-Sham gained  great  importance  with  the  advent  of  the
Ummayad dynasty that had its capital in Damascus. With the fall of the Ummayads,
Damascus and the territories around contemporary Syria lost their political strength and
for the next centuries became part of a contested frontier zone between powers such as
the Fatimids, Ayyubids, Ilkhanate Mongols, Mameluks, and the Ottomans. This shifting
nature of power in the region has contributed to a great diversity of peoples in Syria.
The  Ottoman  empire's  administrative  reforms  in  the  XIXth Century  revised
borders and regional nomenclature several times, for instance under Selim III whose
reforms  can  be  seen  in  the  1803  Cedid  Atlas,  the  first  of  its  kind  developed  and
published in the Islamic world. The  Cedid Atlas was based on European cartographic
49 Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria p. 109
50 Adonis, Violência e Islão p. 26
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works so in effect names were transliterated thus classifying many regions in the Near
Orient  with  terms  originating  from  European  conceptions.  In  the  Cedid  Atlas the
modern-day  borders  of  Israel,  Jordan,  Lebanon,  and  Syria  are  almost  completely
included into the region of  Palestine.  The borders  of  the constituent  parts  of  eyalet
regions,  called  sanjaks,  and  semi-autonomous  regions  such  as  the  mutasariflik of
Jerusalem had a formal delineation while definitions of regions such as Palestine were
more fluid. After the Ottoman reforms of the mid XIXth Century vilayets slowly began
to  replace  the  former  eyalets. The  vilayets  of  the  XIXth Century  that  surrounded
Jerusalem were Beirut to its north, Damascus, Haleb (Aleppo), and Zor to the east.51
These divisions were specifically chosen in hopes of defusing tensions with neighboring
states and European powers.52
The modern state of Syria originates from the collapse of the Ottoman empire in
the  wake  of  World  War  I  and  the  subsequent  partition  of  the  former  Ottoman
administrative  spaces  by France  and  Great  Britain  in  the  1920s.  The  borders  were
delineated with no concern for the former Ottoman regions. That being said, the old
Ottoman elites would still be found working in the bureaucratic systems of many future
Arab States.53 Despite the European interventions in the Middle East, local leaders still
had hopes for a free Syria. In the First All Syrian Congress, 2 of July 1919 the borders
of Syria were designated to include modern-day Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel; a 'Greater
Syria'.54
The  European  powers  however  divided  the  Ottoman empire  into  spheres  of
influence  through  treaties  such  as  the  Sykes-Picot  agreement  (1916)  made  in
conjunction with the Russian Empire. Such agreements reneged on previous wartime
51 Tamari, Salim. “Shifting Ottoman Conceptions of Palestine: Part 2” Jerusalem Quarterly. Issue No. 
48. (2011). p. 6
52 Idem, p. 8-9
53 Quataert, O Império Otomano p. 227
54 Karsh, pp. 26, 109
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deals  such  as  the  territorial  re-arrangements  promised  by  Sir  Henry  McMahon  to
Hussein bin Ali,  the Sharif  of  Mecca.  Sykes-Picot  was outed in  the  Soviet  Union's
Pravda  newspaper which regaled in revealing the backroom deals made between the
Allied “imperialist bourgeoisie” powers in World War I. The treaties of Sevres (1920),
and Lausanne (1923) established the borders for Post-Ottoman Levant: the former was
drafted then rejected before the end of the Turkish War of Independence, and the latter
becoming the final treaty accepted by the Turks who, having fought the war with the
support of Bolshevik Russia against the Greeks and the Allies, founded their Republic.
As a consequence France took control of the Syrian territories which came under
its  rule  in  the  League  of  Nations  Mandates.  As a  former  territory of  the  Ottoman
Empire, Syria was marked as a class A mandate. B and C mandates were dedicated to
former German colonies. During World War II Vichy France maintained de jure control
over Syria, however the end of the war and the admittance of Syria into the United
Nations ended the mandate and marked the start of the modern Syrian Arab Republic.
Bashar  al-Assad has commented that  the “history of  Syria is history of coup
d'etat.”55 The Syrian Army has been at the center of these political convulsions. After a
failed invasion of Palestine with Arab allies to halt the establishment of Israel, Syria
entered an era rattled by a series of army coups. A brief union with Nasser's Egypt under
the  United  Arab  Republic  ended  with  Syrian  army  officers  unilaterally  declaring
independence from the UAR in 1961. In 1963 the Ba'ath party took control of Syria.
The Ba'ath Arab Socialist  Party56 is  a pan-Arabic political party that  was in  George
Kerevan's words, “based on classless racial unity, hence the strong anti-Marxism, and
on national socialism in the scientific sense of the word, such as nationalised industry
and an autarkic economy serving the needs of the nation. Hence, the antipathy towards
55 Rose, Charlie. “Interview with Bashar al-Assad”, 2006. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqQa-
QSMMjs>
56 Ba'ath means renaissance, revival.
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Western capitalism.”
The Ba'ath party was founded in the 1940s by Michael Aflaq,57 and Salah al-Din
Bitar.58 During World War II Ba'ath party members were involved in protests against the
French  government  in  Syria,  in  support  of  the  Iraqi  rebellion  that  requested  the
assistance of Nazi Germany in throwing off the British yoke. The reorientation of the
Ba'ath  towards  the  Soviet  Union  in  the post-War era  was,  according to  Kerevan,  a
decision that  was  guided  by self-interest  as  “Both  in  Syria  and Iraq,  economic  and
military necessity required  an alliance with  the  Soviet  Union,  eroding the old anti-
communism. The attractions of power resulted in personal corruption.”59
The  Ba'ath  party's  organization  was  structured  in  regional  branches  and
operational cells, inherited from its times as an underground party. In 1966 the Syrian
Ba'ath regional branch suffered an internal coup and its leadership was replaced by its
left-wing faction under Salah Jadid.60 The left-wing Ba'ath leadership broke ties with the
Iraqi Ba'ath branch and pursued an even closer relationship with the Soviet Union until
Hafez al-Assad,  promoting an anti-Soviet  position,  rose to  power in 1970.61  Under
President Assad, Syria became governed by an Alawi minority that was deeply resented
by the Sunni majority that represented 60% of the country.62  The Ba'ath party became
dominated by Alawi military officers.63 Assad's rule in Syria was marked by the October
57 Michael Aflaq (1910-1989),  a Greek Orthodox anti-colonialist Christian, philosopher, and author. A 
student at the Sorbonne. Advocate of Pan-Arabic socialism, co-founder of the Ba'athist party. The 
conflict between Nasserite and Ba'ath ideologies led to Aflaq's exile and the Marxist 1966 coup in 
Syria which split the Ba'ath party in Iraqi and Syrian branches. The Assad government condemned 
Aflaq to death in absentia in 1971 for his public criticism of the Syrian Ba'ath party. Aflaq died in 
Iraq, powerless, but still shown a modicum of respect as a founder of the Ba'athist movement.
58 Salah al-Din Bitar (1912-1980), a Sunni, studied at the Sorbonne in Paris along with Aflaq. Bitar was 
Prime-Minister of Syria in March-November 1963, May-October 1964, and January-February 1966. 
He fled Syria after Jadid's left-wing 1966 coup. A critic of the Assad regime, Bitar was assassinated in 
1980. The identity of the assassin is unknown.
59 Kerevan, George. “Ruling party learned from Nazis”. The Scotsman, 
<http://www.scotsman.com/news/world/ruling-party-learned-from-nazis-1-601588>
60 Salah Jadid (1926-1993), strong man of the left-wing Ba'athist faction from 1966 to his ouster by 
Assad in 1970.
61  Karsh, pp. 3-4
62  CIA, Director of Global Issues, “Syria: Scenarios for Change” pp. 1, 13
63  Idem, p. 12
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War, the Lebanese Civil War, the Iran-Iraq war, the Syrian Sunni uprising in the 70s and
80s,  and  the  Gulf  War.  President  Hafez  al-Assad  was  also  allegedly  involved  in
assassinations and has been accused of being a “state-sponsor of terrorism”.64
President Assad chose several individuals as potential heirs throughout his time.
Bassel Assad had become heir apparent until his accidental death in 1994 leaving his
younger  brother  Bashar  Assad  as  the  only viable  candidate  to  continue  his  father's
vision. Hafez Assad died in 2000 and Bashar Assad was elected president of Syria.
Assad's administration has been controversial, such as its suspected involvement in the
assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri,65 an allegation that
President Assad categorically denied.
Yevgeny Primakov,  former  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  is  skeptical  of  Assad's
involvement, writing: “First it strikes me that Syrian  politicians cannot have been the
ones behind the assassinations; they must have realized that the inevitable outpouring of
anti-Syrian feeling in Lebanon would compel the international community to step up its
demands for  Syria  to comply with Security council  resolution 1559 […] Hariri  had
enough political enemies within Lebanon would would have like to get rid of him.”66
Since the spread of the Arab Spring protests in 2011, Bashar Assad has been
embroiled in a bitter war that with many international actors intervening in their own
interest.  President  Assad's  government  has  been  shielded  from  rebel  forces  by  its
intelligence apparatus, clan alliances, militia forces like the Shabiha, the Syrian Army,
Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran. 67
64  Shlaim, The Iron Wall p. 553
65  Rafic Hariri (1944-2005), Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992-1998 and 2000-2004. His tenure 
focused on the rebuilding of post-Civil War Lebanon, however Hariri was accused of corruption as his
wealth grew tremendously during the course of his administration. In addition Hariri supported Syrian
interests within Lebanon. He was allegedly assassinated by Hezbollah (who accused the Mossad of 
the assassination) in an explosive blast in 2005. Hariri's murder sparked protests and eventually led to 
a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon.
66 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs p. 207
67 Napoleoni, pp. 99-100
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Soviet Era
Soviet,  Russian,  and  Syrian  projections  of  their  relations  onto  the  world's
consciousness have been reliant on propaganda. Soviet Communist propaganda was so
successful  the  Bolsheviks  even  found  respect  among  enemies.  Joseph  Goebbels
admitted  in  1933 that  "we National  Socialists  have learned much from the Russian
Bolsheviks"68 Since  its  inception  the  Soviet  Union  freely  used  aggressive
communications  to  skew conversations  in  its  favor.  The  Central  Committee  of  the
Communist Party had an Agitation and Propaganda Department (Russian: otdel agitatsii
i propagandy) working tirelessly to spread the message of Communism and damage the
reputation of its enemies.
Disinformation was created by the KGB, first appearing in 1963, which was a
process that involved the falsification of documents and pictures.69 The efforts pursued
by the  Soviet  Union  in  damaging  and  influencing  the  so-called  imperialist  western
powers  were  labeled  aktivnyye  meropriyatiya, “active  measures.”  These  were  black
propaganda  operations  pursued  by  the  KGB's  First  Directorate.  Black  propaganda,
antonymous to white propaganda, masquerades as propaganda made by a certain group
while  it  is  in  reality published by an opposing hostile  faction.  Gray propaganda,  in
contrast to both white and black, is entirely anonymous. Yuri Bezmenov, a propagandist,
KGB agent,  and Soviet  defector  stated that  maybe 15% of  the  Russian intelligence
funds would be spent on espionage. The rest of the funding would be spent on the active
measures. Bezmenov defined active measures as the process aimed at “[changing] the
perception of reality, of every American, to such an extent, despite the abundance of
information, that no one is able to come to conclusions in the interests of defending
68  van Herpen, p. 3
69  van Herpen, p. 2
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themselves,  their  families,  their  communities,  and  their  country.  It's  a  great
brainwashing process.”70
Active measures functioned in a period of 20 years, as it was the amount of time
necessary  for  a  generation  to  grow  and  absorb  the  propaganda.  This  process  was
organized into different stages: first it involved a demoralization, then a destabilization,
which then in theory would bring a victim country to crisis. The moral weakening of a
nation would prepare it  for the advent of socialism. The tools at the disposal of the
Soviets were many. Among the Soviet Union's lifetime a number of media organizations
served Communist interests, such as the official newspaper of the Communist Party, the
Pravda, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), RIA Novosti, Radio Moscow,
Izvestia, the New Times, and Krasnaya Zvezda; all of which were limited by Article 58
of the Soviet Criminal Code that forbid counter-revolutionary propagandist activities in
any sphere of Soviet society, which was in essence censorship of the press.71
Information  agencies  like  Novosti  were 70% staffed  by agents  of  the  KGB,
according to Bezmenov.72 The Soviet Union spread its hard-line left-wing Communist
ideology  through  these  mouthpieces.  The  fall  of  the  USSR  did  not  result  in  the
extinction of these media organizations. Quite the opposite: what has happened during
the  Putin-Medvedev  years  is  a  revival  and  modernization  of  the  former  Soviet
propaganda  machine.  The  federal  Russian  government  oversees  media  through
Roskomnadzor, the regulatory body of communication which imposes fines and shuts
down media enterprises that run afoul of Russian law.
In  regards  to  Syria,  the  most  popular  channels  of  communication  used  by
Damascus are the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), controlled by the Ministry of
70  Griffin, G. Edward, “Soviet Subversion of the Free-World Press”, Interview. 1984. 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3qkf3bajd4>
71 Idem p. 42
72 Griffin, G. Edward “Soviet Subversion of the Free-World Press” Interview. 1984. 
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Information, and the official newspaper of the Syrian Ba'ath Party, Al-Ba'ath. Hafez al-
Assad, much like his son Bashar al-Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin, was
open to interviews in  the Western media and used informal channels such as Radio
Monte Carlo's Damascus correspondent Louis Farres and  Time magazine to maintain
contact with the West.73
In the current era, the Internet has been a powerful tool at the disposal of both
Russia and Syria, who have their respective government channels on web sites such as
YouTube broadcasting the tune of their governments. How these media outlets have
voiced  themselves  and  their  respective  government's  line  regarding  Moscow's
relationship with Damascus is an inquiry that can reveal a great deal on the thought
process and desires of these two actors in the Middle East. The attitudes that these states
adopt are deeply embedded in a cultural inheritance and an historic output that not only
drive the actions of Russians and Syrians, they are also retrieved in an ad hoc fashion by
propaganda mechanisms to construct narratives that attempt to manage public opinion
in favorable directions.
The Portuguese prime-minister Dr. Antonio Salazar stated in 1949 that “Soviet
Communism  promotes  nationalism  in  Asia  and  internationalism  in  Europe.”74 The
USSR's ideological inconsistency stems from the fact that Marxist-Leninist thought is
insufficient  to  function  practically  in  international  politics.  The  USSR  followed
geopolitical principles when pursuing its  objectives despite geopolitics being a taboo
school of thought in the Soviet Union. Geopolitics are anathema to Marxism-Leninism,
as Marxism seeks to create a socialist revolution in the entire world. Marxism believed
that  class  warfare  between  the  proletariat  and  the  bourgeoisie  would  bring  about  a
global socialist society and that the establishment of Communism was a scientifically
73 Karsh, p. 64
74 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira “O Meu Depoimento”, Notas e Discursos Politicos (1943-1950). p. 355
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verified  inevitability.75 76 Geopolitics  in  Mackinder's  definition  maintains  a
geographically-based vision for political control and delineates zones of influence in the
world: it does not fulfill the preconditions for an international Marxist revolution.
In addition and most critically,  geopolitik was an academic school of thought
encouraged and practiced by the mortal enemy of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany. In
recent years however Mackinder's Heartland theory has been a source of inspiration in
Russia especially to the Eurasian school of thought as exemplified by political thinkers
such as Alexander Dugin, a Eurasianist author who holds influence in the Kremlin.77
Alexander Dugin's  geopolitical  theory is  lifted  directly from Mackinder  but  defines
Russia  as a tellurocratic  (land-ruled) central  “world-island” destined for  domination,
and the Atlantic Anglo-Saxon-led West as the thalassocratic (sea-ruled) “civilization of
the  sea”  surrounding  the  “world-island”,  both  which  are  in  direct  and  perpetual
conflict.78
In Efraim Karsh's analysis the Soviet strategy towards Syria in the 1970s to the
1980s differed from the Western approach in that it adopted a structural and regional
perspective rather than a purely circumstantial and global approach.79 Despite a brief
period of retreat in the 1990s, the strength of the Russian Federation's foreign policy
would gain momentum and reach a new height under President Vladimir Putin. How are
Syria and Russia relevant to each others geopolitical interests? Syria initially was on the
periphery of  Soviet  focus,  and on the  occasion of  its  accession to  the  United Arab
Republic, it briefly ceased to exist. In the immediate post-war Middle East, the USSR
was primarily interested in developing relations with Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iran.80
The formation of the UK and US-led Baghdad Pact in the mid-1950s and Syria's
75 van Herpen, p. 190
76 Karsh, p. 1
77 van Herpen, pp. 190-192
78 Dugin, Last War of the World-Island, pp. 6-7
79 Karsh, p. 2
80 Ibidem
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opposition  to  its  implementation  convinced  the  leadership  of  the  Politburo to  court
Syrian support.  The Soviet Union's interests and objectives in the Middle East have
been  consistent  with  contemporary  Russia's:  to  prevent  interventions  from  foreign
powers, to preserve governments friendly to the USSR, and to establish an outlet for
naval activities for greater influence over the straights of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
with the purpose of ultimately blocking Western war ships from engaging in activities in
the Eastern Mediterranean. In 1955 the Soviet Union announced “aid in any form” to
protect Syrian independence that was endangered by the Turkish-Iraqi threat and the
retaliatory Israeli raids on Arab countries. This led to the first Soviet-Syrian arms deal in
the autumn of 1955.
Within two years Syria had purchased £100 million worth of Soviet weapons. In
1957, the Soviet Union sent a naval unit to Syria in response to heightened pressure
from  the  Turkish  military.  This  was  an  action  that  had  no  precedent.81 In  1957  a
technical agreement worth $579 million was signed between the Soviets and Syrians.
Syria's left-wing Ba'ath faction took power in 1966 rendering Syria almost completely
dependent on Soviet assistance. During this time the Syrian Communist party, while still
suppressed, was allowed to operate. Its leader, Khaled Bakhdash returned from exile.
The Sawt al-Arab, the official communist newspaper of the time, was permitted to be
published and Samih 'Atiyya, a communist, was appointed Minister of Communications
by Salah Jadid.82
In 1967 the Six-Day War resulted in Israel occupying the Sinai peninsula and the
Golan Heights, damaging the standing of the left-wing Ba'ath in Syria. In addition, the
increased influence from the USSR was not welcomed by some in Syria, such as the
Minister of Defense Hafez al-Assad who was a conservative and outspoken critic of the
81 Idem p. 3
82 Idem p. 4
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Soviet Union. In an interview given to the Daily Telegraph President Assad claimed that
the Soviet Style communist type regime reduced Syria from the granary of the Middle
East to an impoverished country and served to isolate it from its Arab neighbors. The
Soviet  Union's  Krasnaya Zvezda warned that  "the internal reaction [in Syria]  joined
hands  with  imperialist  circles,  striving  to   interrupt  the  process  of  socialist
transformation."83
While the Soviet Union would rather abandon the Syrian Communist Party to
maintain its standing with the current government, the USSR and its media still showed
direct support for the SCP. The USSR permitted the publishing of Bakdash's works in
the Soviet Union. In 1978 the New Times cited Bakdash on his belief of the importance
of  supporting  the  Progressive  National  Front,  the  only  political  body  the  Syrian
communists  could participate.  The  Syrian  Communist  Party was alarmed at  Assad's
positions and warned that the "failure to settle the crisis in accordance with [...]  the
framework of the anti-imperialist progressive policy which Syria adopted on the 23rd of
February 1966 [... might] harm the existing relations between Syria and the USSR and
other friendly socialist bloc nations."84
These concerns turned out to be unwarranted as Assad's tenure would see the
strengthening  of  Soviet-Syrian  relations  stemming from a  necessity  to  confront  the
Israeli-American threat. In 1971 Assad made his first official visit the USSR, bringing
with him the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Minister for Petroleum,
Power, and Mineral Resources among leaders of the Syrian Ba'ath party.85 July 1972
two arms deals with the Soviets worth $700 million in total would be concluded under
83 Idem p. 5
84 Ibidem
85 Ramet, Soviet-Syrian Relationship p. 88
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supervision  of  the  Syrian  defense  minister  Mustafa  Tlas.86 87 In  the  same  year  the
Soviets would expand the port in Latakia where Syria had permitted usage of the port
for Soviet vessels.88
The political climate in Syria was not homogeneous in the 1970s. Support for
the West was known, for instance the Minister of Economy Muhammad Imadi89 was
Western-educated  and  friendly  to  the  United  States  while  still  maintaining  familiar
Syrian positions on foreign policy objectives such as the Golan.90 The Soviet political
objective in the Middle East at this time was to maintain the integrity of its allies, Egypt
and Syria, and keep the United States from achieving any progress on monopolizing the
diplomatic  solutions  to  the  Israeli-Arab  issue.  Unlike  Syria,  the  Soviet  Union
recognized Israel's right to exist.
The lead up to  the October  War of  1973 would show that  the Soviet Union
would have to engage in a balancing act to avoid the conflict at first, then later show
meaningful support to Syria and Egypt in the war. Since President Nasser's death the
Soviet  Union's  relationship  with  Egypt  was  endangered.  President  Anwar  Sadat
removed Ali Sabri, one of the staunchest supporters of the USSR, from the echelons of
Egyptian leadership. In July 1972 15,000 Soviet military personnel were expelled from
Egypt.91 Sadat wished to respond to the Soviet Union's reluctance to support Egypt's
fight to recover the Sinai peninsula from Israel. It is interesting to note that the USSR
pressured Egypt more than it pressured Syria to avoid the October War. This was for
several reasons: Assad was reliant on Egyptian support for the war against Israel.
86 Moustafa Tlas (1932-2017), a Sunni Syrian Minister of Defense from 1972 to 2004. Tlas graduated 
from the Homs Military Academy where he met future President Hafez al-Assad. Tlas supported 
Assad in the 1970 coup against Jadid.
87 Karsh, pp. 8-9
88 Ramet, p. 94
89 Muhammad Imadi (b. 1930), technocrat, former Minister of Economy from 1972-1980. Imadi never 
joined the Ba'ath party.
90 Idem pp. 150-151
91 Karsh, p. 10
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The Egyptian-Syrian relationship was not in the same critical state as Syrian-
Israeli  relations,  which  meant  that  Soviet  policy  had  to  target  Egypt  to  avoid
antagonizing Syria which was a precarious and sensitive position. Pedro Ramet quotes
Secretary  of  State  Henry  Kissinger's  memoirs:  “No  Arab  leader  whom  I  met
immediately after the war gave credence to the charges of Soviet-Arab collusion. Sadat,
Algerian President Boumedienne, Syrian President Assad, whatever their differences,
agreed that Moscow had been grudging in its support for the Arab cause, slow in its
delivery of arms, and eager to press for a ceasefire from the first day of war. Indeed, in
his  autobiography Sadat insisted that  while  the Soviets were ignorant  of his precise
plans, Moscow had sought to impede any possible Egyptian move by slowing down
military deliveries and working against him in Syria.”92
Egypt  had  become  increasingly  hostile  to  Soviet  overtures,  leading  Soviet
leadership to conclude that Syria would soon become the main Soviet partner in Middle
Eastern diplomacy.93 However, any attempt at detente between superpowers was highly
criticized by Syria. Responding to the June 1973 Summit between American and Soviet
diplomats, the Syrian Al-Ba'th voiced Assad's disapproval of the breakdown of talks to
reach an agreement stating that the "Soviet-American accord comes at the expense of all
weak and vanquished peoples."94 The October War would see the Soviet Union provide
the most material support to any Third World nation to date: 4,360 tons of supplies were
airlifted while 38,210 tons were shipped out by sea. Israel's sinking of a merchant vessel
elicited a strongly-worded response from TASS: "The USSR cannot regard indifferently
the criminal actions of the Israeli military, as a result of which there are victims also
among Soviet citizens."
However, it is clear that the Soviet mission was to merely feign participation in
92 Ramet, p. 97
93 Karsh pp. 9-10
94 Karsh, p. 11
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the peace discussion in hopes that the USSR's position in the Middle East would not be
compromised. Soviet support  for Syria was tantamount to  a token force of advisers,
supplies, and a vocal approval of Syria's "legitimate [...] right to use all effective means
for  liberation  of  its  occupied  lands.”95 The  USSR's  major  objective  consisted  of
reconvening the Geneva Conference to readdress the Israeli-Arab conflict.
The process through which the disengagements for the October War had been
reached exposed the American advantage over the USSR as a diplomatic intermediary.96
This was clear by Assad's openness to the USA following the October War with Nixon's
visit to Syria in June 1974 and the restoration of Syrian-Israeli diplomatic channels that
had been cut-off following the 1967 Six-Day War. This visit ended on a promise of $100
million dollars in aid from the United States. In March 1974, Assad eased restrictions on
foreign investment.97
This easing of relations with the United States would be short-lived as Assad
became  more  frustrated  with  the  American  focus  on  a  separate  Egyptian-Israeli
agreement. In September 1974 Assad adopted the Soviet position on the necessity of
reconvening the Geneva conference. Lev Talkunov, chief editor of Izvestiya, praised the
Soviet-Syrian collaboration as a model for other countries and criticized the Egyptian
approach.98  In general, the Soviet media had several approaches to their line on Middle
Eastern  relations:  Pravda pursued  moderate  political  solutions  in  the  Middle  East
advocating cooperation with  the United States,  while  Izvestiya and  Kranaya Zvezda
inflated the risk of threat from the “zionist-imperialist” alliance of Israel and the United
States.  Sovetskaia  Rossiia used  interviews  with  Arab  politicians  as  vehicles  for  a
hardline view.99
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However Soviet propaganda and pressure was not enough to halt Egypt's slide
out of the Soviet sphere. In August 1975 a three year Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement is reached. In March 1976, Egypt ended the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with the USSR.100 Sadat's visit in 1977 is in Karsh's view the turning point
of the Soviet-Syrian relationship.
The balance of power in the Soviet-Syrian relationship was turned in Assad's
favor  with  the  official  termination of  Soviet  influence  in  Egypt.  From then on,  the
Soviet  Union would find itself  in  a  delicate  balance of  supporting its  bellicose ally
President Hafez al-Assad, and his uncompromising brinkmanship in such quandaries as
the  Lebanese  Civil  War.  Syria  had  been  involved  in  Lebanon  since  1976.  Syria's
position originates from the old  Rashidun  period claims on Lebanon and the 'Greater
Syria' proposed by the First All-Syrian Congress in 1919.
Syria's concern over Lebanon stemmed over the possible break-up of the multi-
ethnic and multi-religious state. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) began
growing  in  influence  in  Lebanon  after  its  ejection  from Jordan.  By the  mid-1970s
400,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon, erecting a mini-state that was at odds with the
local Lebanese. These tensions threatened to tear the country apart and dissolve it into
ethnic borders.101  Had this been the result, Syria's advocacy of a single-state solution in
Palestine would have been severely hampered by the Lebanese example. The Syrian
Foreign Minister Abd Al Khalim Khaddam declared “Either Lebanon remains united or
it will be returned to Syria."102
In essence the Syrian objective in Lebanon was to act as a diplomatic mediator
between the Islamic leftists and the Christian right and maintain a relative stability in
Lebanon to avoid an Israeli intervention. While in January 1976 Assad intervened in
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favor of the leftist Islamic faction, by March 1976 Assad ordered the Sa'iqa and PLA
military units to halt the threat from the Islamic side that had seen increased successes.
In  June  1976  Syria  officially  invaded  Lebanon  with  its  Third  Armored  Division.
Moscow followed the developments and voiced support for its Syrian ally, labeling the
war as an “imperialist-zionist” plot.103 This was a destabilizing event for Soviet interests
as they witnessed in shock as one of their clients was pitted against another despite
Soviet pressures on Assad to not intervene.104
Israel in  the meantime was not  interested in preventing Syrian action against
Christian  militias  provided  the  Syrians  would  recognize  boundaries  of  military
operations.105 The  Soviet  media  claimed  the  intervention  was  made  at  the  official
request of Lebanese authorities, and that Syria was primarily moved by a “national duty
towards a sister nation” and “compassions for the victims of bloodshed between Arab
brothers”. TASS relayed the opinions of Soviet-Syrian leaders declaring that "two sides
expressed deep concern over the continuing crisis in Lebanon which is the result of
plotting by the forces of imperialism and zionism."106
As the war turned into a quagmire, Soviet opinion began to shift as the USSR
could  not  continue  balance  its  strategy  of  presenting  itself  as  a  defender  of  Arab
interests  while  maintaining  its  strategic  alliance  with  Syria.  TASS  claimed  that
reconciliation between Syrians and PLO would only be possible after Syria pulled all of
its forces out of Lebanon. In June the USSR rejected a Syrian request for material aid.
Krasnaya Zvezda reported on its concern over the “danger of foreign intervention in
Lebanon.” Meanwhile papers such as the Pravda and Izvestia echoed the hopes of the
Soviet  leadership  that  the  Soviet-Syrian  relationship  would  continue  to  grow.107
103 Idem pp. 28-29
104 Ramet, pp. 109-110
105 Karsh, p. 30
106 Karsh pp. 32-33
107 Ramet p. 111
37
Nonetheless by August 1976 media outlets such as Pravda and Radio Moscow admitted
respectively  that  “the  decision  [to  invade]  proved  to  be  harmful  to  the  Palestinian
movement” and that Lebanese patriots and Palestinians were under double encirclement
from Israelis and Syrians.108
Relations between the Soviets and Syrians became so tense that the Soviet Afro-
Asian Solidarity Committee praised the PLO and accused Syria of undermining Arab
struggle against zionism and imperialism.109 After the October Riyadh mini-summit and
Assad's order of a general  cease-fire during its  discussions, the Soviet Union halted
overt criticism of Syrian forces, even admitting to their presence as a peace-keeping
force. Arms shipments were allowed into Syria in 1977 after President Assad threatened
to shut off Soviet access to the Tartus port.110
Assad was also frustrated with the Carter administration that, while being the
first administration to recognize the need for a Palestinian homeland, still unequivocally
supported defense of Israeli interests. Regarding the foreign policy of the United States
of America, Syrian media commented that  "the difference between the policies of the
US Democratic and Republican parties is that the former has no clear feature or specific
identity, while both search for a solution at the expense of Arab rights and territories."111
The Soviet media was also critical American ventures and commentary emanating from
its media regarding the Middle East and accused the Washington Post and Christian
Science Monitor of "[trying] too hard to misrepresent the real essence of Soviet-Syrian
relations."112
Meanwhile, Egypt's concern over superpower interference and a lack of progress
in the peace negotiations led Sadat in 1977 to visit Jerusalem and speak directly to the
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Knesset.  This  resulted  in  profound  change  in  Soviet-Syrian  relations  as  Syria's
vulnerability  and  isolation  forced  it  closer  to  the  USSR,  strengthening  the  Soviet
position. This set the stage for the signing of the Soviet-Syrian Treat of Friendship and
Cooperation. Before the October War in 1973 Syria was too peripheral to warrant such
treaties, and after the war the USSR did not want to estrange Syria or damage relations
by urgently pursing the issue.
After Anwar Sadat's 1977 pivot and Syria's isolation from its Arab neighbors, the
position of Syria regarding the treaty substantially changed.113 In its pursuit of achieving
closer  relations  with  the USSR and securing the Friendship Treaty,  Syria  supported
various Soviet  engagements  such as its  invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In  the UN
Syria abstained from the vote to  condemn the  Soviet  Union,  and Syria  even  called
criticism of the invasion  an "uproar fabricated by world imperialism." Syria was also
not present  at the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) Islamabad conference that
was summoned in the wake of the invasion. When the conference released a statement
calling  for  the  removal  of  Soviet  forces  from  Afghanistan,  Syria  and  the  USSR
responded  with  a  message  that  was  none  other  than  an  impressive  distraction
denouncing "the continuing campaign of the imperialist forces, headed by the United
States, which are exhibiting false concern for Islam, while at the same time supporting
the seizure by Israel of Islamic temples in Jerusalem."114
The Soviet-Syrian Treaty was signed shortly after. In the preamble the Treaty
declared that the Soviet Union and Syria were “filled with determination to administer a
firm rebuff to the policy of aggression pursued by imperialism and its accomplices, to
continue the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and racism in all their forms
and  manifestations,  including  Zionism,  and  to  stand  for  national  independence  and
113 Idem,  p. 51
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social progress.”115 The  TASS claimed in the month of the Treaty's signing October of
1980 that "This is a treaty in the name of peace, not in the name of war."116 Syria would
have rather secured a firm defensive arrangement.
In 1981 to 1982 the situation in Lebanon deteriorated after Israel annexed the
Golan and ordered its troops to cross the Lebanese border. This came at an opportune
moment for the USSR as it  used Israeli  aggression to distract world opinion on the
imposition of martial law in Poland and the recent invasion of Afghanistan.117 In March
1982 the TASS accused US defense secretary Caspar Weinburger of "practically [giving
the]  green  light"  to  Israeli  intervention.  Izvestiya held  more  alarm  in  its  message,
declaring that Israel was preparing to "unleash bloody terror on Palestinians [and] about
to crush Lebanon with its mailed fist."118
The termination of  the Lebanese civil  war rested on the results  of American
pressure and the degree to which Israel felt satisfied in the achievement of its objectives,
in Karsh's words: "There was little the Soviets could do to save their allies from defeat
but put pressure on the United States to restrain Israel."119 The war had a debilitating
effect on Soviet aspirations. In short, the PLO, which was part of the left-wing Muslim
coalition, felt betrayed by Moscow's balancing act in respect to Syria, which was itself
quite pleased at Moscow's behavior. Syria had encouraged insurrections within the PLO
(such as one led by Abu Musa) against Arafat and his al-Fath faction within the PLO.120
Abu Salef, the second in command of al-Fath, reportedly told the Soviets: “What
have you given us? We do not want you to tell us to reach an understanding with the
Syrians. You have lost many of your positions in the Arab world because you did not
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understand  the  conspiracy.”121 Syria's  operational  goals  in  face  of  Israeli  military
superiority were to simply frustrate  Israeli  efforts.  Among Syrian successes was the
evacuation of PLO forces from Tripoli and the American retreat after the embassy and
Marine  HQ  bombings.  Assad  allowed  pro-Syrian  militias  to  operate  from  Syria
controlled Lebanese territory against enemy targets.122 Despite the complicated political
waters the USSR had to navigate, its media outlets continued to reiterate Soviet support
for  the Arab cause,  Radio Moscow stated in May 1983 that  the "Soviet  Union will
continue to support the struggle of the Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and other Arab
peoples against the aggressive schemes of the USA and Israel."123
The Lebanese civil war also carried negative consequences for President Assad.
Syria found itself increasingly isolated from the Arab world due to its occupation of
Lebanon, as evidenced through the disapproval voiced by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the
PLO,  which  had  been  ejected from Lebanon as  a  result  of  the  war.  Sunni  protests
erupted within Syria voicing strong disapproval regarding the Alawite Syrian-Christian
alliance  that  fought  the  left-wing  Muslim  forces.  Even  with  these  challenges  in
consideration, the Soviet-Syrian relationship was relatively undeterred by the setbacks
and diplomatic conflicts. The Friendship Treaty would be tested again over the years,
but  the  bonds  would  gradually  grow  between  Soviets  and  Syrians  throughout  the
1980s.124
In 1986 the CIA's Director of Global Issues (DGI) released a memorandum that
summarized the Syrian situation and presented a number of scenarios that could result
in  the fall  of  President  Assad.  The  DGI's  memorandum briefly analyzed the  Soviet
position in 1986: “The continuation of Alawi dominance would be most beneficial to
121 Ramet, p. 113
122 Karsh p. 76
123 Karsh, p. 78
124 Ramet, p. 115
41
Soviet  interests.  […]  If  Sunnis  gained  power,  Moscow's  position  would  be  weaker
because of Sunni resentment of Soviet support for the Alawis.”125 This is precisely why
President Assad was so eager to crush the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in the late 70's
to the early 80's, and of course why American policy was so eager to see President
Hafez al-Assad and his successor taken down from power.126 According to the CIA,
Syrian troops killed thousands of Sunnis in the city of Hamah in 1982.127 
The New  Times reflected  on  the  Soviet-Syrian  relationship  on  the  third
anniversary of the Friendship Treaty: “It is not easy, however, to undermine the Soviet-
Syrian cooperation  […]  Year  after  year  the  Soviet-Syrian  Treaty of  Friendship  and
Cooperation  serves  as  the  basis  for  rebuffing  the  aggressive  policy pursued by the
imperialists and Zionists.”128 The steadfastness of the relationship would be tested in the
Iran-Iraq War, where the Soviet Union and Syria would support opposing sides. Syria
had earned the enmity of the Iraqi Ba'ath since the ideological split in 1966. Despite
supporting Iran against the Soviet-supplied Iraqis, Syria was valued by the USSR as a
channel  for  communicating  with  the  Iranians,  who  had  rebuffed  Soviet  overtures
towards friendship and wished to topple Saddam Hussein, a prospect unacceptable to
the Soviet Union that steadily grew more supportive of Saddam throughout the war.
While  the  relationship  was troubled  over  the  conflict,  the  war  by no  means
damaged the connection between Moscow and Damascus.129 Aid from the Soviet Union
flowed into Syria, and Syrians gave the USSR preferential treatment: in  March 1983
Syria  gave  the USSR a £120 million contract  to a  power  station outside Damascus
despite the contract  having already been awarded to the Swedish ASEA. Assad also
replaced Boeing airplanes in Syria's national airline with TU-154s. In April 1987 further
125 CIA, p. 3
126 Idem, p. 2
127 Idem, p. 13
128 Karsh, p. 80
129 Ibidem
42
economic and military agreements between the USSR and Syria were made including
developing  Syrian  phosphate  and  oil  industries,  construction  of  the  Tishim  dam,
rescheduling  of  Syrian  debt  worth  $15  Billion,  developing  cotton  industries,
mechanization, irrigation, railways, ports, and the arrival of the first deliveries of the
MiG-29.
On the 22nd of July 1987, the first Syrian cosmonaut flew to space on the Soyuz
TM-3.130 The CIA's 1986 DGI memorandum stated: “The Soviet Union and its  East
European  allies  provide  virtually  all  of  Syria's  arms,  and  the  Soviets  deliver  more
weapons to Syria than to any other Third World client. In spite of his dependence on
Soviet military aid, Assad has remained wary of excessive Soviet influence, and, in the
view  of  Western  observers,  has  demonstrated  his  independence  by  taking  actions
contrary to Soviet wishes such as the invasion of Lebanon in 1976.”131
What major lines of logic and consistency can be found in the Soviet period of
Moscow-Damascus relations? The Soviets were at times limited by political situations
unfavorable  to  decisive,  brazen action.  Syria  and especially Assad's  personal  nature
were  difficult  to  handle  in  face  of  the  USSR's  desire  to  avoid  escalating  tensions.
Brezhnev and Chernenko were models for Gorbachev's foreign policy which exercised
caution and restraint.  Soviet  policies that encouraged Assad's brinkmanship were the
exception and not the rule.132
In  fact,  Yevgeny Primakov points out  that both superpowers “expended great
efforts to bring stability to the Middle East” and were not willing “to allow a situation to
develop in which they might get drawn into a direct military conflict with each other.”133
In general Syrians were provided with enough help to enact effective policy and the
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Soviets in return gained bases, a market for arms exports, a Mediterranean port, and
diplomatic  support in  the United Nations.  Soviet  interests  were global  while Syria's
were regional, and the flexibility of interests allowed for at times a great divergence in
objectives. This was tolerated in accordance to the fluctuations in international affairs.
The post-war system constrained great power maneuverability and tilted influence in the
favor of smaller states. Syria embodied this being the only consistent ally for Moscow
in the region and the linchpin that spited US monopolization of the Israeli-Arab peace
process.134 135
Assad  regularly  accused  Israel  of  being  a  power  with  “aspirations  beyond
Palestinian territory. [...] Israel aspires to the establishment of a state from the Nile to
the Euphrates.”136 This echoes the intentions of a Zionist foreign policy article entitled
“A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s” that is now called the Yinon plan, after its author
Oded Yinon. It was written in 1982 for the journal Kivinum, advocating the incitement
of ethnic and religious identities and the replacement of neighbor governments such as
Syria with principalities favorable to Israeli interests. In Yinon's words: “The dissolution
of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon,
is Israel's primary target on the Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the
military power of those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall
apart, in accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states […] so
that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area,
another Sunni state in Damascus hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who
will set up a state, maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern
Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in
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the long run,  and that aim is already within our reach today.”137 Avi Shlaim described
Syria's position in the Middle East by the end of the Cold War: “Syria was the standard
bearer  of  Arab  nationalism.  After  the  defection  of  Egypt,  the  PLO,  and  Jordan,
Damascus became the last redoubt of Arab resistance, holding out for complete Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan Heights.”138
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Post-Soviet Era
The early decade of the 1990s was a period of instability for Russian and Syrian
relations.  The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a retreat on several fronts, giving
leeway on American influence in the Middle East. Gorbachev and Assad's support for
the Gulf War was highly indicative of acquiescence before the domination of American
interests. Assad was particularly criticized domestically for siding against Iraq in the
Gulf War.139 140 During the Yeltsin years, the Chechen rebellion and NATO expansion
would bring public opinion to an historic low and deliver harsh criticism upon President
Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.141
It  was not  until  later  in  the Yeltsin  years  that  the Russian Federation would
achieve  a  cohesive  policy under  the  scholarly arabist  Yevgeny Primakov,  who was
appointed  Foreign  Minister  by  Yeltsin  in  1996.  Primakov's  foreign  policy  doctrine
called for  a  strong state  to  handle outside challenges,  and in fact  Putin's  popularity
partially stemmed from Primakov's influences in the foreign policies decisions taken by
the  Russian  Federation.  In  short  the  policies  since  1996  were  to  extend  Russian
influence  into  post-Soviet  states  and  neighboring  countries,  establish  alliances,  and
avoid US influence from growing in areas of Russian interest.
Yevgeny Primakov criticized his predecessor Kozyrev, affirming that integration
with Western liberal democracy left Russia in a humiliating position. This is repeated in
the works of Russian writers such as Dugin, who for instance denounced the so-called
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“Koyrev Doctrine [which] held that unipolarity was an accomplished fact.”142 Primakov
presented three fundamental ideas on what the ideal post-Cold War era Russian policy
should be: First, that Russia could not be thought of as a European power but instead
had to be envisioned as a Euroasiatic one. Second, Primakov advocated the formation of
a multi-polar world and the end of western ocidentalism.
Third and last, Primakov specified that Russian policy should focus on the old
Russian satellite states where 25 million Russian speakers resided.143 Yeltsin initiated a
process that Putin would follow. Igor Ivanov144 replaced Primakov in 1998. Ivanov also
voiced heavy criticisms of NATO and American foreign policy. In 2004, Ivanov was
replaced by the current Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.145 146
The relations between the West and Russia during the Putin years have been
slowly disintegrating, while Russia is very far from innocent, blame does not solely rest
on the shoulders of the Russians. Western leaders broke promises made with Russia,
especially in respect to the expansion of NATO in the 1990s.147 Professor Stephen F.
Cohen claimed that  the  Ukraine  crisis  happened because  the  Russian  elite  believed
NATO  was  on  its  way  to  Kiev.148 To  be  clear,  Russia  has  violated  the  Budapest
Memorandum that  exchanged nuclear weapons for the territorial  integrity of  several
post-Soviet  states.  Russia  invaded  the  borders  of  a  sovereign  country and  annexed
territory that legitimately belonged to Ukraine ever since the Kuruschev years when the
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Supreme Soviet accepted the proposal to reorganize Crimea under the Ukrainian SSR.149
It is not only a question of language or nationality, but a question of fulfilling promises
and respecting international agreements.
In the meantime, in support of its ally, Syria voted against the denouncement of
Russia's  annexation  in  the  UN General  Assembly.  Despite  the  controversy  and  the
intensity of the debate, Russia's past must be reflected upon to understand their leader's
positions:  the Mongol empire, Napoleon, Hitler,  the collapse of the USSR, all these
experiences  have  left  Russian  strategists  haunted  by  a  prospective  encirclement  of
Russian borders. An ostensibly anti-Russian alliance expanding into post-Soviet states
and areas formerly under the Russian sphere can only be received with hostility. The
Iraq-Afghanistan invasions, the expansion of the EU, the color revolutions in Georgia,
Ukraine, Moldova, and the Syrian situation after the Arab Spring all led to a powerful
sense of discomfort in the Kremlin circle.150 It  certainly did not help when American
leaders  such as Senator  John McCain taunted on Twitter  in  2011:  “Dear Vlad,  The
#ArabSpring is coming to a neighborhood near you.”151
It  is  irresponsible  thinking to  express,  especially considering how Muammar
Qaddafi was sodomized with a knife by American-backed rebels after his capture as a
result of the Arab Spring.152 No matter what someone may think of Col. Qaddafi, the
lack of a trial and his summary execution were not indicators of a positive development
for human rights in Libya. Putting aside Senator McCain' dangerous ramblings, what
are the sober American intentions for the future of Russia or Syria? What is currently
occurring in the Middle East is the American clean-up of old Cold War pawns: Qaddafi,
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Mubarak, Saddam, and Assad among others. Revolutions are approved and supported
by Western powers. These are geopolitical moves that are planned with respect to the
American Long War strategy.
In  2008 the RAND Corporation released a book detailing an analysis  of the
Long War and the multitude of ways America could manage it. In its introduction, the
RAND authors wrote “The long war has been described by some as an epic  struggle
against  adversaries  bent  on  forming  a  unified  Islamic  world  to  supplant  Western
dominance, while others characterize it more narrowly as an extension of the war on
terror.”153 The  American  focus  lies  on  three  threats  identified  by  RAND:  jihadists,
religious-national organizations like Hezbollah, and political pan-Arab parties such as
the Ba'ath.154
Therein lies the cause of the modern conflict between the West and the Russian-
Syrian  alliance:  Assad's  administration  in  Syria  is  Ba'ath  dominated  and  has  open
relations  with  groups  such  as  Hezbollah.  The  Syrian  government's  initial  failure  to
contain  the  rebellion  has  led  its  territory to  become swamped by a  chaotic  tide  of
Salafist militias including the Islamic State.  Matthew G. Olden, Director of the USA's
National  Counterterrorism  Center  estimated  in  2014  that  there  were  nearly  15,000
foreign fighters in Syria, 2,000 of which came from the West.155
US President Barack Obama's policy in Syria was to support all opponents of
Assad no matter the moral cost, even against the warnings of the Head of the Defense
Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Micheal Flynn. America had to take a leadership position
in guaranteeing at least a negotiated stale-mate where a part of the deal would involve
President Assad stepping down from power. Gen. Flynn cautioned that mercenaries and
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militias supported by the United States were proponents of fundamentalist Islam. This
did not matter to President Obama, who even took a blind eye to Turkish President
Erdogan's  own funding  of  rebel  groups  associated  with  al-Qaeda.156 After  President
Donald  Trump's  upset  victory in  the  2016 US Presidential  election,  Lt.  Gen.  Flynn
would become embroiled in a media controversy that forced his resignation as President
Trump's National Security Adviser based on allegations of improper contact and illegal
financial dealings with the Russians. The results of America's short-sighted and insistent
support  of  factions  in  the  Middle  East  during  the  Obama  administration  are
encapsulated in Democratic pollster John Anzalone's words: “We spent $500 million
training Syrian rebels and got nothing.”157
Since  the  late  1990's  Russia  has  developed  a  powerful  propaganda  machine
along with a restoration of the Soviet espionage system in an attempt to attack Western
aspirations. Among many governmental reforms there have also been developments in
allocating unprecedented budgets for propaganda, modernizing media, hiring lobbyists
in the West, developing relationships with western politicians, funding western political
parties, and utilizing the openness of Western media to spread a pro-Kremlin message.158
Under  Yeltsin,  the  KGB  was  split  into  several  organizations:  the  Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR), the Internal Counterintelligence Service (FSB), the Border
Guard  Service  (FSR), the  Federal  Protective  Service (FSO),  and the FAPSI.  Putin's
administration would reform these branches in 2003, placing the FSR and the FAPSI
under  the  management  of  the  FSB,  slowly  increasing  its  power.  The  SVR and  its
military counterpart,  the  GRU, operate  in  foreign intelligence gathering working on
tasks such as industrial espionage, filtration of collected information, and infiltration of
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foreign governments and international organizations.159
Broadening definition of treason, in 2012 the Duma amended articles 275 and
276 of the criminal code, a move proposed by the FSB that echoed Article 58 of the
Soviet criminal code.160 Non-governmental organizations were banned under a tax law.
Foreigners  were  impeded  from  funding  parties  and  media  organizations  while  the
Kremlin enjoys the same privileges in Western countries.161
Under Putin,  the Russian intelligence apparatus has been revived with vigor.
Oleg Gardievsky, a former KGB agent, warned of the Russian intelligence's mindset:
"They're spying on all western countries like mad. It's just in their psychology and their
tradition."162 The situation regarding Russian espionage has grown to worrisome levels,
for instance, the Russian embassy in Vienna employs double the number of diplomats
employed by the US embassy and four times that as the French. Hans-Georg Maasen,
director of the BfV illustrates the severity of the situation with an historical example:
one  third  of  Russian  diplomats  stationed  in  Berlin  in  the  Cold  War  were  Russian
spies.163 Between 1960 and 1986 France expelled 83 KGB and GRU officers.164 
The Russian government uses every tool at its disposal to spread its message.
Television, newspapers,  radio, internet, even the Orthodox church is considered as a
valuable asset, as it is staffed with former KGB spies such as Patriarch Kirill  whose
former KGB codename was “Mikhailov”.165 This was the same patriarch who visited
Ukraine several times to insist upon the spiritual, cultural union between Ukrainians and
the Russians who at  the time were threatening Ukraine with economic and military
pressure.166
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Russian strategists believe that the XXIst Century will witness hybrid wars where
control  and production of propaganda is essential.  Marcel van Herpen quotes Stefan
Halper on the Chinese perspective of this conflict:  "The Chinese public information
chief, Li Chang-Chun, explained his government's view […] 'Communications capacity
determines influence, whichever nations communications capacity is  the strongest, is
that nation whose culture and core values spread far and wide... with the most power to
influence the world.'”167
Among the Kremlin's most powerful tools is the international multilingual TV
Network Russia Today (RT). The Federal government of Russia allocates vast sums of
money into RT's production: in 2005 it's budget was $23 million, by 2011 it surpassed
$380 million with over 2,000 employees. RT holds a special record as well: it was the
first  news  media  account  to  get  one  billion  views  on  Youtube.168 It  has  been
controversially received,  at  one  point  RT broadcast  a  Syrian  War documentary that
according to UK Ofcom was biased. RT presented the massacre as doing of "the rebels"
and not the government forces. The idea remained unchallenged during the duration of
the documentary.169 RT UK showed a Jewish man allegedly "Fleeing Kyiv" to escape
anti-Semitism, but in actuality it was a man escaping Simferopol in Crimea after the
Russian annexation.170 RT also hosts interviews with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
who explains, in soft-spoken English, his point-of-view directly to the general public.
The  Syrian  government  itself  operates  an  official  Youtube  channel,
PresidencySy, which hosts interviews explaining the Syrian war through the eyes of the
administration, focusing primarily on the international interference and the “terrorist”
elements involved in the war of which Syria has been a victim, and downplaying the
167 Idem, p. 6
168 Idem, p. 71
169 Idem, p. 279
170 Idem, p. 3
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violence in which the Syrian Arab Army and forces allied to it have participated. Videos
on  the  channel  include  a  video-op  of  President  Assad  visiting  and  speaking  to
shopkeepers and average people on the street, accompanied with uplifting music.171 In
2012, the Minister of Information Adnan Mahmoud accused foreign powers of lying
and propagandizing their view of Syria: “We know that 80% of the satellite channels
dedicate 30 minutes of their news hour to Syria today. And a recent study shows that
90% of satellite coverage on Syria has nothing to do with the actual situation in the
country. It’s all lies and fabrications. This again proves that there is a real information
war waged against Syria, with real facts being substituted with fabrications. These lies
are the only way for them to achieve their objectives in their war against Syria.”172
A critical event occurred in 2013 that put Syria and the US on the edge of direct
conflict:  the  gas  attack  that  struck  the  Ghouta  suburb  in  Damascus.  The  Obama
administration immediately accused Assad of being the perpetrator but shied away just
as Western military forces were ready to attack Assad. Regarding the tragedy, Seymour
Hersh wrote an article “The Red Line and the Rat Line” detailing why, according to
Hersh's sources, President Obama pivoted so suddenly on following up to his 'red-line':
“Obama’s change of mind had its origins at Porton Down, the defence laboratory in
Wiltshire. British intelligence had obtained a sample of the sarin used in the 21 August
attack and analysis demonstrated that the gas used didn’t match the batches known to
exist in the Syrian army’s chemical weapons arsenal.” 
The source from where the sample originated, according to Hersh, was from a
“trustworthy”  Russian. Hersh  and  his  anonymous  sources  assert  that  a  US-backed
logistical support network, a “rat line”, was created from Libya through Turkey and into
171 PresidencySy, “Made in Syria.” Youtube. Youtube, June 8, 2017. Web. July 26, 2017. 
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Syria in an attempt to provide weapons to anti-Syrian government forces. The control of
this line was cut off from Turkey in the aftermath of the attack on the US Consulate in
Benghazi. Soon after reports emerged that Turkey began unilaterally supporting groups
such as al-Nusra and even supplying chemical weapons material.
In May 2013 members of the Islamist Al-Nusra Front were arrested in Turkey
for allegedly procuring a purchase of equipment and chemicals that were involved in the
production of sarin. The Turkish ambassador to Russia denied the claims and stated they
were  merely  carrying  “anti-freeze.”  Hersh  claims  Turkey  supplied  the  chemical
weapons for the Ghouta gas attack out of desperation to involve the United States in a
war against  Syria so that President Erdogan could create a Turkish-oriented satellite
state in Syria. In Hersh's words: “Our senior military officers have been told by the DIA
and other intelligence assets that the sarin was supplied through Turkey – that it could
only have gotten there with Turkish support. The Turks also provided the training in
producing the sarin and handling it.’”173
The Syrian Arab News Agency denied all “terrorist” claims that the government
participated in the attacks, accusing opposition of perpetrating the assault with weapons
looted from Syrian Army bases, while spokespeople from the rebel forces reflected the
charge, accusing President Assad. The Russian intervention in 2015 was the first major
Russian  foreign military venture beyond its  immediate  borders  since  the fall  of  the
USSR, done at the request of the Syrian government to combat the Islamic State among
other coalitions.
The fog of war obscures the conflict in Syria and discussion surrounding it. So
far  the  relationship  the  Israelis,  the  Turks,  the  Qatari,  and  the  Saudis  have  with
opposition forces  is  subject to  much speculation,  but  overall  the news is  grim.  The
173 Hersh, Seymour M. "The Red Line and the Rat Line" London Review of Books Vol. 36 No. 8 (2014): 
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Clinton Emails revealed a strong collusion between the Gulf States, as former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton and failed Presidential candidate commented: “[...] we need to
use our  diplomatic  and  more traditional  intelligence assets  to  bring pressure on the
governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and
logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups in the region.”174 Ribal al-Assad,
cousin of President Bashar Assad, wrote in the  India International Centre Quarterly:
“[the] key players in the region are not only anti-democratic, they are also hoping to
benefit from an increase in sectarian divisions and extremism.”
Ribal Assad asserts that the pressure originates in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who
fear that a democratic wave in the Middle East will cause the collapse of their absolute
Islamic monarchies. The Gulf States use propaganda as a means to achieve their goals:
WISAL and SAFA TV stations broadcast Islamist ideology calling for the mincing of
minorities to feed dogs. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia called on Muslims to destroy
churches  throughout  the  Middle  East.175 The  Gulf  State's  desire  is  to  dominate  the
Muslim world and beyond. To their detriment, there is competition from Iran which
supports militias like Hezbollah and states such as Assad's.176 Assad is the target for a
Sunni strategy that includes plans to extend oil pipelines through Syria, Turkey, and into
Europe.
Russia could suffer an economic blow with the success of this plan, as it would
severely  damage  Gazprom and  Rosneft's  bottom line.177  The  insistence  by foreign
powers such as the Saudis and the United States that the Assad administration has to go
is not is not a new phenomenon. The CIA stated in 1986: “we judge that US interests in
Syria probably would be best served by a Sunni regime as it might well include relative
174 Wikileaks, “RE: Here's what I mentioned”  <https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/55380>
175 Assad, “Syria and the Arab Spring”, India International Centre Quarterly, p. 86
176 Clapper et al, pp. 8, 17
177 Kennedy Jr., Robert F. “Syria: Another Pipeline War”. Ecowatch. p. 4 Web. 
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moderates interested in securing Western aid and investment. Such a regime probably
would be less inclined to escalate tensions with Israel.”178
It is clear that President Putin is intent on frustrating the United States on every
major  front  in  reach.  Russia  will  be  hard-pressed  to  consider  the  United  States  as
anything but a rival. President George Bush, the man who looked President Putin in the
eyes and saw a trustworthy man, said in 2014: “Vladimir’s a person who in many ways
views the U.S. as an enemy [...] And although he wouldn’t say that, I felt that he viewed
the world as either the U.S. benefits and Russia loses or vice-versa. I tried of course to
dispel him of that notion.” Russia aims to increase its influence and global standing by
achieving its  vision of  a  multipolar  world.  President  Putin  very openly asserted  "A
unipolar world is not only unacceptable, but impossible."179
 Syria's  behavior  ultimately  will  be  conditioned  by  how  it  perceives  outside
attitude towards it. As Hafez al-Assad once explained his position in the Cold War: “By
saying we are non-aligned we are not equating the two superpowers [...] Syria befriends
those who befriend it and is hostile to those who are hostile to it."180 This brings to mind
John Herz's astute observation, as quoted by the vice President for Studies of Carnegie
Endowment  George  Perkovich,  regarding  the  paradoxical  predicament  in  national
security where the “structural notion in which the self-help attempt of states to look
after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for
others  as  each  interprets  its  own  measure  as  defensive  and  measures  of  others  as
potentially threatening.”181
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Conclusions
Russia  should  be  addressed  with deep  skepticism as  long  as  its  government
follows authoritarian models of governance and is staffed with politically compromised
individuals.  Since the  end  of  World  War II  the Soviets  and  later  Russia  have  been
focused on destabilizing the Atlantic alliance and damaging relations between European
nations that, when properly banded together, could act as a collective counter-weight to
Russian pressure. Threats, shows of force, illegal actions, and violations of basic rights
such  as  free  speech  and assembly perpetrated  by Russia  should  be  responded with
decisiveness  that  indicates  strong  disapproval  of  actions  made by the  state  without
antagonizing and needlessly hurting the people of Russia. This can be achieved with
policies that have been put through the test such as sanctions at the individual level,
expulsions of foul actors, a consistent case-by-case countering of propaganda, and most
importantly addressing the core issues in international relations in an honest and direct
manner through ordinary government  channels  and domestic media.  The West  must
behave in such a way that does not feed credibility into accusations of  Western “double
talk” or play into the hands of Russian propagandists.
Regarding the Syrian War, its conclusion will be complicated by several entities
that have grown in influence throughout the war and the international interests involved
in the conflict. The partition of Syria is a goal of many foreign actors and it will be
extremely  unlikely  that  Assad  will  allow  any  humiliating  capitulations  in  post-war
Syria, especially with Russian and Iranian support.  Among the greatest concerns are the
Kurds who have fought a tremendous campaign and expect to have at the very least
greater autonomy or even independence which will be at odds with the wishes of other
countries with meaningful populations of Kurds such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.
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Above all, to secure peace in the region, it is imperative that Iran and the Gulf States
begin a process of deescalating support for the promulgation of  jihad and Islamism in
all of its forms.
That being said, this war does not exist in a regional vacuum, and it is necessary
for the West to look at itself to find answers about what can be done to prevent more
chaos. Israel, America's closest ally in the region, has relied on aggressive maneuvering
and shows of force as primary tools in assuring its survival in a hostile climate. These
actions inflame world opinion against Israel and the United States, to the great detriment
of their national security. Many times Israel has run contrary to the ways a country is
expected to act. Israel must cease expansionist policies, end unilateral military actions,
and suspend its nuclear weapons capability182  to achieve, or at least come closer to, a
deal with the Arabs on recognizing Israel's right to exist. Existence ideally should not be
guaranteed only by force but through mutual recognition.
The United States must adopt positions that strengthen its soft power capability
rather than destroy it. Actions taken in the XXth and especially the early XXIst  centuries
legitimize warfare as a means of achieving foreign policy goals and set the tone for the
behavior of nations throughout the world. This has been a disaster for US interests and
the credibility of the United States as a force for good. Western medias have failed as
journalistic  entities  and  have  become essentially  propaganda  machines.  The  United
States  as  the  most  powerful  military  and  economic  force  in  the  world  should  be
capitalizing on its position rather than abusing it for short term gain. To give way to
peace and prosperity, truth should become the top priority and not blind self-interest.
182 Idem, p. 68
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